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In the Suprente Court of the
State of Utal1

FLORENCE BUCKLEY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
STANLEY COX and ALICE T. C'OX,
his wife, and KARL COX,
Defendants and Appellants.

CASE
NO. 7730

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
(Numbers in parentheses preceded by "JR'' refer to
pages in Judgment Roll file; plain numbers in parentheses
refer to pages in Transcript).
STATEMENT OF CASE
In this action the plaintiff, Florence Buckley, brought
suit against the defendants for damages for use of a driveway and to quiet title to the driveway as against the defendants. The complaint alleges: "2. That the plaintiff
is the owner of .the home and premises known as 914 North
University Avenue, in Provo, Utah County, State of Utah,
and more particularly described as follows, to-wit:
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2
Commencing 4.54 chains West and 2.07-1/3 chains
South 1~ o West and North 89~ o West 4 rods of the
Northeast corner of Section 1, Township 7 South of
Range 2 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said
point of beginnng being on the South line of the Stanley Cox land ; thence along said line North 8914 o West
8 rods, more or less to the East line of University Avenue; thence along the East line of said avenue South
1~ o West 1.46 chains more or less the north line of
a street; thence along the North line of said street
·South 89° East 8.00 rods more or less; thence North
1~ o East 1.46 chains, more or less to beginning.
''3. That the North 12 feet of the above described
property constitutes a driveway owned by the plaintiff and
used by her as a means of ingress and egress to and from
the rear of her said premises;-" (JR 3, 4).
Count one of the complaint is for damages for use of
driveway by the defendants and the second count is to quiet
title to the driveway as against the defendants.
The defendants answered the ~complaint and counterclaimed alleging that the property line dividing the properties was at the center of the driveway and that it was a
joint driveway for the properties of plaintiff and defendants and further that by adverse user for more than 30
years by the defendants and their predecessors they had
acquired a right to the use of said driveway by prescription
and asked judgment quieting title to their use of the following, a right of way across the south six feet of the following described real estate in Utah County, Utah, to-wit:
Commencing 66-1/3 links South and 4.54 chains
North 89~ o West of the Northeast corner of Section
1, Township 7 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian; thence North 891_4 o West 3 chains;
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3
thence South 114 o West 1.50 chains; thence South
891ft o East 3 chains; thence North 11J! a East 1.50
chains to the place of beginning.
and of the six feet immediately south thereof as a joint
driveway as appurtenant to the property of plaintiff and
defendants (JR 9) .
At the trial of the case plaintiff testified that she had
given permission for the use of the driveway to Heber Taylor (12). She allowed Mr. Cox to use it when he came
there (13). The cement approach to the drive was put in
while Mr. Taylor lived there but Mr. Cox paid for half of it
(14). She testified that the Coxes had claimed a right to
the drive before 1948 but that they had never had any
trouble prior to that time (18). That the check was. given
in payment of rent for all the time he ever used it. She
had never asked for the payment (25). Admitted she had
testified on deposition that \Ve had asked Mr. Cox a good
many times not to use the driveway but he has just gone
right on and used it. Asked him not to use it the first time
a long, long time ago, Well, we will say twenty years. That
he had claimed a right to use it and had continued to use
it since that time. Cox used it whenever he wanted to, just
like it was his road, like we didn't have any claim to it at
all. Cox had used it that way at all times since he moved
there (26-28). That she had testified on her deposition
that the Cox property line had been determined when the
property v;as divided. That there are stumps of the old
fence still in there (29) . She was then asked: "Q. You
testified on your deposition that Mr. Cox had always
claimed the right to use of the driveway since he had been
there? A. Yes, he has." (30). On re-direct examination
she testified that she had said in her deposition: "Q.
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And after Mr. Cox came there isn't it true also that what
use he made of the property, of the driveway, he made by
permission? A. By permission. Q. And sufferance on
your part? A. Yes." (35).
Mr. Beazer, a surveyor, identified Plaintiff's Exhibit
"C" and stated that the dotted line, 4.5 feet south of the
north line is where two old stubs of posts were set. On
cross examination he stated he couldn't determine any old
posts along the survey line (59). That the commencement
point of the plaintiff's description would be 3.9 feet into
the driveway (61). That the inclusion in the description
of "said point being the southeast corner of the land of
Stanley Cox" would not change the line (63).
For the defendants Mr. Heber Taylor testified that he
owned the Cox property for five years from 1922 to 1927
(65-66). That the former owner showed him the north
boundary line, a fence (66). That while he owned it he
had a talk with plaintiff and "she indicated that we owed
her half of this cost of this strip because of the relationship existing in terms of the right of way." The question
arose in conversation with her as to the payment of the
half cost of the cement strip on the parking because of it
being a joint right of way there (68-69) . Plaintiff never
gave him permission to use way _and he never asked her ·
to allow him to use it (69). On cross-examination he testified that he claimed south of the hedge. Did not put his
hedge south of where it was because there was a joint right
of way there (71). Didn't recall talking with plaintiff except her asking for the payment of half of the cost of the
strip. It was because it was a joint right of way (72).
Talk he had with plaintiff shortly after he left was con-
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cerning the payment of the half of the strip, cement strip
(73).

Mr. Cox testified that plaintiff had asked for the
money and she informed him how much was owing for our
half of the driveway (75). Made payment of $37.53 in
September, 1928. No mention made at any time that payment was for rent (76). Told her at that time he intended
to ue it and maintain it as a right of way (77). Has used
the driveway every time it was needed (77). Used it once
or twice a week during summer and not so much during
the winter (78) .
Plaintiff said nothing about use of
driveway until about two years ago or a year ago. Hauled
some sand and put on driveway in early 30's.. Put some
clinkers on driveway and also some gravel (79). On cross-_
examination he testified that the writing on the check, defendants' exhibit "1" "curb and gutter" was on it when it
was delivered and that when he filed it he wrote "right of
way'' on it (83). Parked car in driveway quite a. bit dur..
ing '27, '28, and '29. Always stopped there when he came
home for lunch. About six times a week (88). Florence
Buckley objected when he told her roomers no~ to park on
drive at night in 1948 (90). Had traveled back 12 rods
on driveway (99). Used it_ to bring lumber in 1944 (101).
Always has had openings from driveway to Cox; property
(102).

The defendant Mrs. Cox testified that·. they used . the
driveway every year. Hauled lumber in for bee boxes and
the boxes out. Hauled fertilizer for their garden. Kept a
trailer there except in winter. Hauled building materials
in there and the boys kept their car in the garage at rear
of the lot. (115-). Before they built garage drove car about
2/3's of ·the way back and turned in to their place and
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parked car (115). No trouble over use of driveway until
last 2 years (118). Saw Stanley Cox put clinkers on driveway but not all times he did it (120). Put them on every
year until converted to, oil about 4 years ago (121). In
1938 plaintiff asked her to trim hedge and keep her side
of driveway clean ) 122-123) .
Karl Cox testified that when he was young his father
made him help carry out ashes and some of ashes went on
driveway. That went on from time he was big enough to
do it until he went into army in 1945. Had used driveway
all his life (125).
For the plaintiff Clark Newell testified that there was
a gate across driveway at coal house. Gates were taken
down about 1940 (137). Had never seen Cox use driveway (139). Would go there at six in morning and seven
at night. Sometimes at noon (141). Never saw Heber
Taylor use drive. No opening to Cox property from driveway back there (143). No break in hedge for eight rods
back until 1940 (144).
Fred J. Richan testified for plaintiff that he knew
premises and saw Coxes use it and it was all in recent years.
Saw vehicle belonging to defendants on drive during last
20-25 years (146). Said Cox said "Well, I have exaggerated on my measurements a little." (148). Would usually
go there Sundays or holidays. Twice a week and usually
at night (149-150).
Ern Buckley testified for plaintiff as follows: They
never had any trouble because they never used the road
any more than just probably to get back and forth. Never
saw Cox haul a load of gravel or ·cinders on driveway. They
never used the road any more than just probably to get
back and forth (152) . There were two sets of gates (153).
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Plaintiff was asked if she remembered a conversation
\vith Mr. Cox in which he said he \Vas going to use the
right of way and that plaintiff had said "That is your privilege". Didn't remember it. Didn't know whether she
told him that or not (160-161). She said she had testified
in her deposition that ,.,Q. But more so the last two
years? A. He has taken it over the last two years, it
doesn't belong to us any more. Q. But before that he
used it? A. He used it whenever he wanted, we didn't
say anything to him." (162). She also admitted that she
had testified that: ''A. Yes. Of course after Mr. Cox
got his road on the north then I thought that would relieve us, he wouldn't have to have two roads to his place,
you know. Q. But he continued even after that? Yes,
he continued to use it. A. And claimed the right to use
it? A. And claimed the right to use it.--'' (163).
The Court made its findings of fact and conclusions
of law and judgment that the plaintiff is the owner of the
real property described in plaintiff's complaint and quieted
title to it, including the driveway along the North side
thereof, and restrained and enjoined the defendant from
using said real property or in any manner interfering with
plaintiff's use and enjoyment, including said driveway.
The defendants moved for a modification of the judgment or for a new trial. The motion was denied and defendants, jointly and severally appeal from the judgment.
STATMENT OF POINTS
1. The evidence is insufficient to support finding of
fact No. 2 (JR 16).
2. The evidence is insufficient to suport the finding
of fact that the claims of said defendants, and each of them,
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are inferior to the rights and claims of the plaintiff, Florence Buckley, and are without any right whatsoever, and
the said defendants, Stanley, :Cox,· and Alice T. Cox, his
wife, and Karl Cox, have no estate, right, title or interest
in or to the said above described property, including said
driveway, or any part thereof (JR 17) .
3. The evidence :is insufficient to support finding of
fact No. 9a (JR 17~18)..
4. The evidence is insufficient to support ·the finding
of fact that it was untrue that these defendants and the
predecessors of these defendants have used the same as a
joint driveway for more than thirty years next preceding
the commencement of this action; that said· use has been
,made under a claim of right and adverse to the· claim of
plaintiff to the ownership thereof and to the claim~ if any,
of the predecessors in interest of plaintiff ·(JR 18).
5. · The evidence is insufficient to support.· the finding of fact that it was untrue that these defendants have
used said driveway to drive automobiles and trucks of the
same and to walk thereon for more than twenty-two years
prior to the commencement of this ·action and that such
use was consented to by the plaintiff (JR 18).
6. The evidence is insufficient to· support· finding- of
fact No. 9b (JR 18-19).
7. The evidence is· insufficient to support the finding
'that' the allegation of defendants was untrue that they had
a right also by adverse user for more than thirty years
by these defendants and their predecessors in interest
(JR 18).
8. That the evidence is insufficient to support the
finding of fact that it was untrue that these defendants and
the predecessors in interest of these defendants have used
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the said right of way as a point driveway for more than
thirty years next preceding the commencem~nt of this action; that said use has been made under a claim of right
and adverse to the claim of plaintiff to the ownership thereof and to the claim, if any, of the predecessors in interest
of plaintiff (JR 19).
9. The evidence is insufficient to support finding of
fact No. 9c (JR 19).
10. The evidence is insufficient to support finding of
fact No. 9d (JR 19).
11. The findings and conclusions are insufficient to
support the judgment.
12. Appelants' motion for a new trial should have
been granted (JR 26-28).
13. That the court erred in entering judgment against
the defendants that they had no right to the use of the
driveway set forth and described in defendants' answer
and counterclaim (JR 21-23).

ARGUMENT
It is the contention of appellants that \vhere, as in this
case, the plaintiff admits that she knew the defendants
claimed a right to the adverse use of the driveway and
does nothing, that when the period of limitations has
passed, the rights are established. Where knowing that the
defendants claim, as of right; the use of a driveway for a
period of more than twenty years, and the plaintiff permits
or allows its continuance by sufferance for such period of
time, she may not, by claiming such use to have been by
permission, toll the running of the statute of limitations~
Point One. The evidence is conclusive that the north
:3.9 feet of thedriveway is not within the description of the
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premises set forth in paragraph 1 of the findings (61).
The remaining points, except Point Eleven, are related and really present the main contention of appellants
in this case. They will be treated together. All such points
refer to the findings of fact on which the judgment is based
that the defendants had not established a right to the
driveway either as joint owner or by adverse possession.
To establish an easement by prescription the use must
be for 20 years, open and adverse, or to the knowledge of
the servient owner, ·continuous, visible and under claim
of right. Norback vs. Board of Directors, 84 Utah 506,
37 Pac. 2 339. In the case of Fogarty vs. F1ogarty, 61 Pac.
570, a California -case, the law is stated as follows:
"2. Where plaintiff claimed water diverted by defendants by adverse user for six years, a finding that
neither plaintiff nor his grantors have had open, notorious, adverse use of the water does not negative
plaintiff's claim of adverse user, since all that is necessary to make a use adverse is a claim of right and
knowledge of the claim in the adverse party, it may
be adverse without being open and notorious."
The former owner, Mr. Heber Taylor, testified that he
was shown_ the property and that half of the driveway was
his ( 68-69) . Plaintiff made demand for payment of half
the cost of the runway into the drive (72-73). He owned.
the property from 192.2-1927 (65-66). Stanley Cox testified that plaintiff had asked for money for hi~ half of
driveway and this was paid in September, 1928 (75-76).
He told her at that time he intended to use it and maintain it as a right of way (77). He has used it every time
it was needed and about on-ce or twice a week during the
summer and not so much during the winter (77-78).
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The plaintiff in this case established every element of
adverse use and possession in her direct testimony and on
cross examination. She admitted on cross examination
that on her deposition in this case she had testified that
Cox had claimed a right to use the drive\vay and he had
continued to use it whenever he wanted to, just like it was
his road and like \Ve didn't have any claim to it at all. Cox
used it that way at all times since he moved there (26-28).
She was then asked: "Q. You testified on your deposition that Mr. Cox had always claimed the right to use of
the driveway since he had been there? A. Yes, he had."
(30). On re-direct examination she testified that she had
also said in her deposition: "Q. And after Mr. c·ox came
there isn't it true also that what use he made of the property, of the driveway, he made by permission? A. By
permission. Q. And sufferance on your part? A. Yes."
(35).

Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d Edition,
Unabridged, gives the definition of Sufferance as 1. Patient endurance; long suffering; forbearance under provocation. In other words we have here the testimony of the
plaintiff that Stanley Cox had always claimed a right to
use the driveway and had used it as though it were his
own and as though she had no claim to it and she had patiently endured under this provocation. What more could
be done to establish proof of adverse use of the driveway?
This Court has frequently held that the testimony of
a \vitness is no stronger than as shown by cross-examination. It was so decided in the case of Edwards vs. Clark,
96 Utah 121, 83 Pac. (2) 1021.
Quoting from Porter vs. Hunter at page 154 of the
Pac. reports:
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Plaintiff's testimony is no stronger than
what he testified on cross-examination, and the evidence elicited from him on cross-examination must be
regarded as part of the evidence given by him in chief.
Wilson v. Wagar, 26 Mich. 452.
"(2)

" ( 3) Defendant testified definitely to the terms
of the contract, and, there being no denial by plaintiff
on his cross-examination or at any time, it is beyond
cavil that the contract was as alleged in defendant's
answer, and that the contract as thus established by
the testimony was not fulfilled by plaintiff."
Defendant Stanley Cox testified to his claim to the
right of way (77). There is no denial of this by plaintiff
and in fact she testified that he had always made that
claim (30) .. At the instance of her ·counsel she said that
this use had been by sufferance on her part (35). If she
had stoped the use of course the time element for adverse
use could not have been established, but by permitting and
suffering the Coxes to use the driveway knowing they
claim such use as a right for a period of more than twenty years, she is now estopped to deny their right to it.
The finding that defendants had not used the property adversely is simply not borne out by the testimony
of the plaintiff herself. Such finding by the court is clearly error.
This Court in the case of Norback v. Board of Directors, etc., 84 Utah 506, 37 Pac. (2) 339, at page 344 quotes
with approval as follows:
"Thompson on Real Property, vol. 1 s.475, makes
the following statement: 'In an action to establish a
right of way by prescription the question is for the
jury whether the use was under a claim of right, or
was merely a matter of neighborly accommodation."
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It \Vill also be noted that the north line of the Cox
property is probably determined by an old fence 'that had
been established many years before the Coxes bought the
property. The surveyor testified that measuring from the
line of the posts for a distance of six rods, the frontage of
the Cox property, \vould put the line 4.5 feet inside the
driveway. Mr. Cox testified that he had measured from
the line of posts several times (80-81). Maybe Mr. ,Cox
was mistaken in his claim to the center of the driveway
but this mistake would not mitigate against his claim of
right to the driveway during all the years he has been
there. In the case of Bales vs. Pidgeon, an Indiana case
reported at 29 N. E. 34, it is stated:
"Where adjoining land owners agree upon their
division line and establish a road supposed to be on
the land of one of them, which road for 50 years is
used by the subsequent owners of the land and by the
public, the road cannot be closed by the owner of one
of the tracts, when he finds by a re-survey that the
road is on his land, instead of the adjoining as it was
supposed to be.''
This would certainly seem the right answer as if there
never \Vas a mistake and never a claim of something that
actually did not belong to the claimant there would be no
adverse possession or user.
'

With respect to Point Eleven the findings give the legal description of the plaintiff's property and it does not
cover the north 3.9 feet of the driveway. The correct description of this property was known by the plaintiff before suit and by the court on the evidence of Mr. Beazer.
The finding limits the right of the plaintiff to that part of
the driveway within the description given in the findings
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of fact and this is not done in the judgment. Based on
such finding. the court could not order the defendants to
stay off all of the driveway.
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence is conclusive that the right to use of the driveway by the defendants has been established. They have used it under
a claim of right to the knowledge of the owner for more
than twenty years and she suffered them to use it during
that period. She cannot now say that because she allowed
them to make such use, knowing they claimed it as of
right, that it is such use that will not ripen into an absolute right.
Defendants respectfully submit that because of such
error, they, and each of them, are entitled to a reversal
and to direction that judgment be entered for them and
against the plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,
,.·J. C. HALBERSUEBEN,

Attorney for Defendants
and Appellants
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